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INTRODUCTION 
In modern legal systems, complex provisions regulate the structure of 
corporations, defining the nature and role of governing bodies, the 
organizational structure and modes of functioning, and the powers and 
obligations of those who take part in corporate operations. Depending 
upon the size and nature of the corporation, its structure may be 
complicated, multi-layered, centralized or decentralized, and organized 
somewhat hierarchically. There may be different models of organization 
and different chains of command or control. 
The complexity of the corporate structure raises difficult issues over 
the allocation of responsibility for the consequences of unlawful behavior 
by individuals acting on the corporation’s behalf. This is particularly true 
when the corporation and its shareholders materially benefit from the 
criminal conduct. 
In the criminal law context, all modern systems share the basic 
assumption that criminal responsibility should be placed on the individuals 
who commit a crime in the corporation’s interest. To what extent, and in 
what ways, should the corporation as a legal entity also be held legally 
responsible for criminal acts committed to further corporate objectives? 
 * Professor of Criminal Law, University of Pavia (Italy) and Fellow of the Institute for Legal 
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The great ideological divide in modern systems concerns whether 
criminal law applies to the corporation itself. In some systems criminal 
law controls the criminality of both individuals and the corporate entity 
itself. Other systems restrict criminal law to punishing only the criminal 
acts of individuals. Where corporate liability is recognized, the rules vary 
in defining the circumstances under which it may be imposed. 
In a world of multi-national corporations and business arrangements 
that cross borders, we may expect the laws regulating corporations to 
converge. But a surprisingly wide gap persists among developed nations in 
the mechanisms available to combat corporate criminality. 
Modern systems that reject corporate criminal liability dismiss the 
notion that some corporations have more potential to cause harm than 
individuals. These systems do not accept that these organizations are 
criminogenic entities. Consequently, they fail to recognize the need to 
counteract these organizational offenders through criminal law. 
Systems rejecting corporate criminal liability are usually justified not 
by policy analysis but, rather, by formal doctrinal theory. The fiction 
theory and the later humanity principle arrive at similar theoretical 
conclusions for the continued validity of the dogma societas delinquere 
non potest.1 These theories affirm that mankind alone is the focus of 
criminal law; only individuals have the capacity of self-determination and 
the capacity for moral choice, and the essence of criminal liability relies 
upon a sum of physio-psychic factors unique to individuals. From this 
perspective, criminal responsibility requires a living person to be indicted 
for personal conduct, as corporations can neither be imprisoned nor suffer 
the effects of criminal punishment. In this context, retribution and 
rehabilitation are meaningless objectives. Moreover, it is argued that 
criminal sanctions against organizations provoke a spill-over effect on 
innocent third parties, such as non-culpable shareholders. 
An emphasis on personal liability also can be observed in systems that 
have formalized the rule of corporate criminal liability as essentially 
derivative. Some of these systems have introduced the principle of 
organizational criminal responsibility, but have rejected the idea of 
requiring a corporate mens rea before liability will be imposed. The result 
is a method of attributing criminal responsibility to the corporation, while 
avoiding any need to prove its culpability. If the corporate agent is 
blameworthy and the agent acted on its behalf, the corporation is also 
blameworthy. This mode of analysis is regarded as serving policy goals 
 1. This is the widely-known principle that a corporation is incapable of criminal liability.
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without violating formal doctrinal logic. Such compromise models of 
corporate criminal liability are interesting to analyze, as they signal the 
difficult transition from tradition to modernity. 
This Article considers modern systems of criminal justice and the 
different models of assessing responsibility for crimes committed to 
benefit corporate interests. The analysis is two-pronged. 
First, this piece examines systems that have adopted the principle of 
corporate criminal liability. Within this category, a further important 
distinction must be made between the most evolved models, which have 
accepted a requirement of corporate culpability, and those models that 
reject the idea of an organizational mens rea, imposing instead various 
corporate liabilities without any separate measure of corporate 
blameworthiness. 
Second, this piece considers those models that reject the principle of 
corporate criminal liability and are restricted to the use of extra-criminal 
mechanisms for the regulation of corporate crime. 
I. DEFINING THE MAIN MODELS 
In Common Law systems, legal principles originated with the 
judiciary, which were in turn thematized by legal theorists and 
subsequently codified and refined in legislation. In civil law systems, 
reform usually begins with the codes that govern. In these systems 
pressure for code reform has been generated by concerns of the dangers 
posed by corporate fraud and the need to harmonize the laws of European 
Union States. 
Scholarly documentation of corporate fraud in recent years has 
undermined civil legal systems’ level of comfort with corporate immunity. 
The ideological pressures of the international movement of 
Modernizierung des Strafrechts,2 and the need to harmonize the laws of 
the EU countries, eventually led most western nations to accept the 
principle of societas delinquere potest. 
Corporate criminal liability currently exists in many legal systems, 
including the United States, England, Australia, Canada, Finland, 
Denmark, France, and in the European Corpus Juris. But these systems 
use models of corporate criminal liability that differ in three important 
respects: 
 2. Translated means “Modernizing the Criminal Law.” 
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A. The choice of which organizations are criminally liable; 
B. The typology of the offenses attributed to corporate entities; 
C. The criteria for attributing responsibility to corporations. 
II. ORGANIZATIONS SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL LAW CONTROL 
In examining the mechanisms of corporate criminal liability, an 
important contrast concerns the identification of the organizations subject 
to criminal liability control. The comparative experience suggests three 
possible models or solutions. One approach is to use the term 
“organization” without any definition or restriction. The second approach 
is to list all the specific types of organizations upon which criminal 
liability may be imposed. The third approach is to restrict liability to only 
those organizations that the civil law considers legal entities with status. 
Under the first approach there is a general model, which takes no 
specific legislative stance on the typology of punishable organizations. 
Emblematic of this model is the Australian legislation on corporate 
criminality: the 1995 Criminal Code Act contains not only a rule, but a 
specific set of provisions directed at corporate criminal liability.3 
However, it avoids any express indication of the typology of organizations 
subject to criminal law.4 Indeed, Div. 12.1 (1) establishes that the Code 
“applies to bodies corporate in the same way as it applies to individuals,” 
but does not define the concept of “body corporate.”5
The second approach is a specified liability model, worthy of particular 
consideration because it sets forth a definite list of criminally liable 
organizations. The main reference model for this systemic choice is that of 
the United States. The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines defines the 
organizations which are subject to regulation. “‘Organization’ means a 
‘person other than an individual.’ 18 U.S.C. § 18. The term includes 
corporations, partnerships, associations, joint stock companies, unions, 
trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organizations, governments and 
political subdivisions thereof, and nonprofit organizations.”6
 3. Criminal Code Act, 1995, c.2 Div. 12.1(1) (Austl.), available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/ 
html/pasteact/1/686/pdf/CriminalCode1995.pdf. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.1 cmt. n.1 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (citations omitted). 
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The same method has been adopted in Canada. Section 2 of the 
Canadian Criminal Code extends criminal liability to organizations by 
defining the terms “everyone” and “person” to include “public bodies, 
corporate bodies, societies and municipalities in relation to the acts and 
things that they are capable of doing.”7
The third approach is a traditional bipartisan model that reflects the 
classical opposition between legal-status and non-legal-status entities. 
Some European legal systems, influenced by theoretical but outdated 
suggestions, have attributed corporate criminal liability only to legal-status 
entities. French and Danish law are emblematic in this regard. The leading 
legal literature in this area invokes reasons of effectiveness and safety, as 
an effort to rationalize limiting liability to only legal-status entities. The 
lack of precise criteria defining non-legal-status entities creates uncertainty 
and confusion for the courts. 
In contrast, the solution adopted by Dutch law appears more modern. 
The Dutch Penal Code has eliminated all theoretical questions, from a 
criminal law standpoint, eliminating the distinction between legal-status 
entities and non-legal-status entities.8
The alternative discussed here is a broad definition of organization that 
includes both legal-status and non-legal-status entities, and both private 
and public entities as defined by statute. This is so in light of the adequacy 
of the cheaper American and Canadian systems, which generate lists of 
specific organizations subject to criminal liability. In the preferred broader 
system, any organization that consistently participates in economic activity 
should be eligible for penal liability whether the organization is a 
corporation or not. 
III. TYPOLOGY OF OFFENSES 
Comparative analysis shows the existence of different systemic 
approaches addressing the problem of which offenses can be attributed to 
corporations. 
The first method is the absolute parification of physical and juristic 
persons. In this view, organizations are criminally liable for all the same 
offenses that can be attributed to individuals. The second method is to 
avoid a general rule designating the typology of crimes imputed to the 
corporation and, instead, to legislate for organizational liability crime by 
 7. Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 2 (2005) (Can.). 
 8. 51 Stb. (1990) (Neth). 
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crime. The third method is to list which crimes can be committed by 
collective entities such as corporations. 
First, the paradigm of plenary liability for physical and juristic persons 
deserves specific mention. This method is adopted by the Australian 
Criminal Code and by the Canadian and Dutch systems. The Australian 
Criminal Code plainly affirms that “a body corporate may be found guilty 
for any offense, including one punishable by imprisonment.”9
This is a remarkable solution, although perhaps too general considering 
the complexity of the activity to be regulated. It is an important method 
nonetheless, from a criminal policy perspective, because it expresses the 
impartiality of criminal law in the face of two types of actors—physical 
and juristic persons—that are considered equally relevant both formally 
and substantively. 
The second method is that found in French legislation. The French 
Penal Code adopts the “specialty principle,” by which corporate criminal 
liability does not cover a large spectrum of offenses but applies only when 
there is a express mention “in the law or in a Regulation.”10 This technique 
of incrimination, aimed to a specific goal, has been rationalized by 
invoking criminology as a science. Whether a corporation is punished is 
therefore based upon statistics providing how frequently the corporation is 
involved in crimes. 
Nonetheless, the application of French law to corporate crime is by no 
means comprehensive. Although the list of crimes ascribed to corporations 
is virtually exhaustive, the principle of corporate criminal liability does not 
apply to economic crimes, labor law, consumer law, or media law. If this 
is seen as representative of the class of special liabilities and exclusions, 
there are reasons to be wary of the approach, as there are no obvious 
reasons to justify these exclusions. 
The third method is that followed by the United States. The U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines include a detailed list of the offenses covered under 
the regulation. This list includes most of the crimes committed in the 
corporate environment, such as theft, money laundering, bribery, fraud, 
antitrust offenses, and tax offenses.11
The American approach is remarkable for its clarity. In contrast, the 
French system, by failing to list specific crimes, may lead to confusion due 
 9. Criminal Code Act, 1995, c.2 Div. 12.1 (Austl.), available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/ 
html/pasteact/1/686/pdf/CriminalCode1995.pdf. 
 10. C. PÉN. art. 121-2 (1994) (Fr.). 
 11. Criminal sentencing applies to “all organizations for felony and Class A misdemeanor 
offenses.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 8A1.1. 
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to its extensive and inconsistent legislative materials. An interpreter may 
search through numerous statutes for a provision making a corporation 
criminally liable. 
The American method represents the more rational and practical 
option. Any legislation that seeks to regulate corporate criminal liability 
should be placed in the general part of the criminal code, among a detailed 
list of offenses imputed to organizations. This is the solution that gives the 
best guarantees of precision. 
IV. CRITERIA OF ASCRIPTION OF THE ACTUS REUS 
As to the selection of criteria for attributing the actus reus to the 
corporation, a comparative view does not produce clear contrasts. The 
U.S. system is the most significant point of reference: here, the civil law 
system’s notion of respondeat superior automatically transfers into the 
domain of criminal law. 
The respondeat superior theory also is adopted, with insignificant 
variations, by the Australian Criminal Code, the Dutch Penal Code, and 
the Danish Penal Code.12 The principle of respondeat superior represents 
the implementation of the principles governing vicarious liability: the 
actus reus and the mens rea of the individuals who act on behalf of a 
corporation are automatically attributed to the corporation. This rule, 
which has authoritative support in the “organic theory” developed in 
Germany by Otto von Gierke, requires the presence of several conditions. 
The corporation is criminally liable if: 
a. an agent of the corporation commits a crime, 
b. while acting within the scope of employment, 
c. with the intent to benefit the corporation. 
Two alternatives emerge from the implementation of this theory. These 
alternatives concern the scope of the rule of respondeat superior, 
specifically, the concept of the agent.  
The concept of agent may include all the individuals who act on behalf 
of the organization; or in the alternative, only managers in the corporation. 
Interpretating “agents” as those who act on behalf of a corporation does 
not limit the notion of agent to the managers who decide the internal and 
external policies of the corporation. The broad definition of agency in this 
 12. STRAFFELOVEN [Penal Code] 1996 (Den.). 
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sense includes all individuals who work in the corporation. This 
interpretation is one followed by most U.S. jurisdictions. The corporation 
is always criminally liable, even if the offense is committed by those 
situated at the lowest levels of the organization. This interpretation of 
agency significantly influenced Australian legislation. The Australian 
Criminal Code Act states that “[i]f a physical element of the offense is 
committed by an employee, agent or officer of a body corporate acting 
within the actual or apparent scope of his or her employment, or within his 
or her apparent authority, the physical element must also be attributed to 
the body corporate.” 
“Scope of employment,” as conceived in the first alternative, has been 
extended by the courts. The traditional interpretation limited the concept 
of fault to acts “expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised” by the board of 
directors. The interpretation fashioned by the courts includes within the 
“scope of employment” all acts corresponding to the general patterns of 
employee behavior as agents. 
Finally, with respect to the requirement that the act be done with the 
“intent to benefit” the corporation, it is important to note that courts 
currently do not require that the agent acts with the intent to benefit the 
corporation exclusively. Even a “mixed motivation,” an intent to only 
partially benefit the corporation, is enough to satisfy the “intent to benefit” 
requirement. 
The alternative method, interpreting “agents” as encompassing only the 
managers of the corporation, is followed by the Model Penal Code (MPC) 
and by the French system. Section 2.07 of the MPC defines a three-
dimensional scheme of corporate criminal liability. For the most serious 
and dangerous offenses, it recognizes criminal liability of corporations 
only in those situations where a corporate director or a high managerial 
agent authorized, commanded, performed, solicited, or recklessly tolerated 
an offense by a corporate employee or agent.13 In drafting the rules 
regulating corporate criminal liability, French Lawmakers adopted a 
narrow standard for attributing corporate criminal liability, under which 
only the behavior of the official “organes ou représentants”14 of the 
organization is relevant when attributing responsibility to the 
corporation.15
If broad coverage is the objective, the U.S. practice is preferable. The 
U.S. experience has demonstrated the weakness of restrictive standards of 
 13. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1962). 
 14. Organs or representatives (trans.). 
 15. See C. PÉN. arts. 121-1, 121-3 (2003) (Fr.). 
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liability, which were practically misapplied by courts and fiercely 
criticized by scholars for lack of effective deterrence. 
V. THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULPABILITY 
On the viability of corporate culpability, a great theoretical divide 
exists, separating countries that have accepted the principle of corporate 
criminal liability from those that have not. Some systems, for instance 
those of the United States, English, Australian, Canadian, Dutch, and 
Finnish, have developed the idea of requiring a corporate mens rea. In 
contrast, the French system and the European Corpus Juris drafted a 
standard of organizational criminal liability that considers evidence of 
corporate blameworthiness to be irrelevant in determining corporate 
liability.  
There are two problems with this latter approach to culpability of 
corporate crime that finds corporate mens rea irrelevant. The first concern 
is that it is theoretically awkward and by no means required by an essential 
characteristic of the corporate form. The second problem, a practical one, 
relates to the fact that this approach hinders effective regulation of 
corporate behavior. Due to the many forms of the modern corporation, 
some inspired by extreme decentralization, certain offenses can only be 
attributed to the corporation when it is dealt with as one cohesive unit. It 
sometimes is impossible to prove the culpability of individuals who act 
within the organization. In such a case, the corporation is the only actor 
that feasibly can be considered criminally liable. 
This analysis begins with the systems that reject the idea of a corporate 
mens rea, focusing on the solution adopted by French law. Article 121-2 
of the French Penal Code states that “organizations . . . are criminally 
liable . . . for the offenses committed on their behalf (pour compte) by 
their organs ou représentants.”16  
The French legal literature speaks of “responsabilité par ricochét” to 
describe this mechanism. That is, the attribution of crime to the personne 
morale, the moral character, requires that two phases of judgment are 
positively performed: the first concerns the physical person, and the 
second concerns the juristic person.17 These two phases are distinct, 
because they are ordered in precise succession in space and time. If the 
first prong is not successfully completed, a case will not reach the second 
prong. The criminal liability of the individual first must be proved; only 
 16. C. PÉN. art. 121-2 (1994) (Fr.). 
 17. Id.  
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after that burden is met is it possible to address the corporation’s criminal 
liability. In particular, the French legal construct does not require proof of 
corporate culpability. Rather, when the élément matériel (actus reus) and 
the élément morale (mens rea) of the offense are established with 
reference to an individual, “the cause and effect relationship (but not the 
culpability) between the commission of the crime and the activity realized 
on behalf of the organization must be proved.”18
Considering the systems that take into account the existence of a 
corporate mens rea, it is important to note that the conception of corporate 
liability has not always meant the same thing. A comparative analysis 
shows, in fact, that various corporate mens rea constructs can be inserted 
into two different categories. 
The first group includes the anthropomorphic models, which measure 
organizational blameworthiness by using the standards traditionally 
applied to individual culpability. The second group includes the 
organizational models, which determine culpability based on the 
characteristics of the corporation, on its policies, and its practices. 
More specifically, the anthropomorphic models include the 
identification theory and the collective intent theory. The identification 
theory was developed in primis by English law and now is recognized by 
the Australian, Canadian, and Finnish systems. 
This rule, also known as the alter ego theory, was explicitly formulated 
in the English case Tesco Supermarkets, Ltd. v. Nattrass,19 the leading 
case for this approach. 
The identification theory relies upon the assumption that all legal or 
illegal acts committed by high-level managers are properly identified with 
the activity of the corporation: the offenses charged against these high-
ranking personnel automatically attribute to the organization. Under this 
theory, it is unnecessary to require any further translative mechanism of 
proof, as those in management positions act not as agents of the 
corporation, but as the corporation itself. The anthropomorphic approach 
is exemplified by Lord Denning’s description of the division of roles 
within the organization: 
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a 
brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands 
which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from the 
centre. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and 
 18. Id. 
 19. [1972] A.C. 153, 169–71. 
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agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot 
be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and 
managers who represent the directing mind and will of the 
company, and control what it does. The state of mind of these 
managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the 
law as such.20
The collective intent or aggregation theory may also be connected to 
the anthropomorphic scheme. In the leading U.S. case United States v. 
Bank of New England,21 the Bank of New England was convicted for 
willfully violating the Currency Transaction Reporting Act,22 although 
there was no proof that any individual employee had willful intent at the 
moment of the actus reus. The rationale is based upon the difficulty in 
identifying an individual offender who operates within a complex and 
decentralized structure. Under these circumstances, a finding of the 
collective intent is “not only proper but necessary.”23 Any other rule would 
allow a company to compartmentalize information and thereby avoid 
criminal liability. Thus, if one assumes a crime with elements A, B, and C, 
where A is known to officer A, B is known to officer B, and C is known to 
officer C, then, for the purpose of criminal liability, all elements are 
known by the corporation. 
Both the identification theory and the collective knowledge issue, are 
fascinating but not entirely persuasive. They also are not suited to the 
operational elements of a corporation. 
Application of the alter ego principle only punishes wrongdoing in the 
boardroom; it does not cover crimes committed by corporate agents other 
than top managers. Moreover, it does not include crimes that rely on a 
defective organization, because the diffusion of responsibility that 
characterizes the postmodern corporation prevents identification of a 
single offender. 
Even the collective intent theory does not work when the corporate 
actus reus is committed against the will of a minority of the shareholders. 
There are four organizational models of corporate culpability. These 
models are more interesting and complete, because they focus on the 
organization’s structure, practices, and policies. This article deals with 
 20. HL Bolton Engineering Co. v. TJ Graham & Sons, Ltd., [1957] 1 Q.B. 159, 172 (Eng. C.A.). 
 21. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 22. Currency Transaction Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5322 (1982). 
 23. 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987). 
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these four models in turn: corporate policy, corporate culture, preventative 
fault, and reactive corporate fault. 
Under the corporate policy model, corporate culpability may attach 
under any corporate policy that intentionally or foreseeably enables illegal 
actions. First, corporate crimes may be found where the policies 
themselves are illegal because they compel or authorize criminal conduct. 
Second, illegal actions may occur when policies and practices, although 
lawful in themselves, encourage corporate crime in a foreseeable way. 
Even a managerial stance tolerating, or showing systematic blindness 
toward, criminal conduct can support a finding of corporate culpability. 
Under the corporate culture model, a finding of culpability rests upon 
the assumption that the personality of the corporation encourages its 
agents to commit crimes. This model has emerged gradually in the U.S. 
since the 1970s. 
In 1975, Christopher Stone spoke of the corporation as “a 
community[,]” with “its own attitudes, norms, customs, habits, and 
mores.”24 Three years later, Wally Olins affirmed that corporations have 
their own distinct personalities and ethos by which they express their 
identity.25 In 1982, Terrence Deal and Allan Kennedy specified the 
elements that characterize a corporate culture: the environment in which 
business is done, the values inspiring the corporation, the main actors of 
the corporation, and the cultural background.26
More recently, some scholars explicitly affirm the existence of a 
corporate mens rea and emphasize a connection between corporate 
blameworthiness and the structure of the organization. Marshall Clinard 
focuses on both internal and external factors as affecting illegal behavior.27 
Pamela Bucy speaks of the corporate ethos, positing the existence of 
corporate criminal liability when this ethos motivates corporate agents to 
commit a crime.28 Among the elements characterizing ethos, Bucy cites 
hierarchical structure, corporate goals, post-offense behavior, and the 
existence of a compliance program.29
 24. CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS; THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE 
BEHAVIOR 228 (Harper & Row 1975). 
 25. See WALLY OLINS, THE CORPORATE PERSONALITY (Design Council 1978). 
 26. TERRENCE E. DEAL & ALLAN A. KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES 13–15 (Addison-Wesley 
1982). 
 27. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE CORRUPTION: THE ABUSE OF POWER (Praeger 
Publishers 1990). 
 28. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 
75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1101 (1991). 
 29. Id. 
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In 1995, Australia adopted a modern and complex model of corporate 
culpability, expressly addressing the problem corporate culture as a fault 
element. According to the Criminal Code Act, “corporate culture means an 
attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the 
body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the 
relevant activities takes place.”30
The preventive-fault model of criminal culpability finds liability when 
a corporation fails to insert and implement an adequate internal system of 
controls to prevent the commission of a crime. Requiring such a 
compliance and ethics program allows a finding of corporate liability “for 
failing to take reasonable steps to prevent or detect criminal conduct.”31 
This model of culpability is found in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 
Under this model, the implementation of an effective compliance and 
ethics program by a corporation acts not only as a mitigating factor in 
determining the fine assessed to a corporate offender; it also represents a 
strong incentive for monitoring corporate policies and for modeling a law 
abiding corporate ethos. In the United States, the existence of an effective 
compliance and ethics program has become virtually prerequisite to 
avoiding a finding of corporate negligence. 
Professors Fisse and Braithwaite propose a model of reactive corporate 
fault.32 Reactive fault exists when a corporation fails to react satisfactorily 
to the actus reus of an offense. Failure to undertake effective preventive 
and corrective measures in response to the discovery of an external 
element of a crime is a form of corporate fault. 
In order to control corporate crime, a model of corporate criminal 
liability must be based on the existence of a corporate mens rea. In 
determining corporate liability, it is necessary to establish that the 
corporation itself is criminally liable; and that liability does not derive 
merely from an individual’s guilt. 
The structure of modern organizations often prevents identifying and 
proving the personal liability of individual offenders. Corporations no 
longer correspond to juristic persons as theorized by Max Weber.33 Under 
the Weberian Idealtüp, the juristic person follows a bureaucratic model of 
governance aimed at efficiency, by means of strict allocation of tasks and 
 30. Criminal Code Act, 1995, c.2 Div. 12.3 (6) (Austl.). 
 31. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8B2.1(a)(6)(B). 
 32. BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY 47–49 
(Cambridge University Press 1993). 
 33. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich trans., 
University of California Press 1968). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p547 deMaglie book pages.doc11/8/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
560 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:547 
 
 
 
 
roles. Compliance is ensured by thorough hierarchical control centered 
around predictability and coordination within the corporation. 
This hierarchical pyramid structure no longer exists. Corporate 
governance is now decentralized, because such a framework reacts more 
promptly to the market fluctuations and technological change. The effect 
of this framework is to diffuse responsibility. Fragmentation of liability is 
due mainly to specialization, which may be both vertical and horizontal 
within the corporation. When working only within a small sector, one 
cannot be fully aware of what happens within other sectors. One may not 
perceive that one’s own seemingly innocent actions, when combined with 
the actions of other individuals, may contribute to the commission of a 
crime. Each individual’s action is a cause-in-fact of the crime, but no 
individual could be found criminally liable. 
In order to find corporate fault without individual culpability, 
traditional criminal norms may not work. The models of criminal liability 
in France and in the European corpus juris, although recently 
promulgated, are already outdated and inadequate to counteract corporate 
crime. 
Questions arise as to how the mens rea requirement should be 
structured. The organizational model is preferable, because it does not 
impute corporate culpability from individual actions. It focuses on 
organization peculiarities and culture. 
The proper construction of corporate culpability should consider a 
multitude of factors in assessing corporate fault. The best approach would 
find corporate culpability in any of the following circumstances: by having 
a policy that expressly or implicitly compelled, encouraged, authorized, or 
in any way tolerated the commission of the offense; by having a culture 
that directed, encouraged or tolerated the commission of the offense; by 
failing to implement a compliance program or exercise due diligence 
preventing the commission of the offense; or by failing to take preventive 
measures in response to the commission of an offense. 
VI. MODELS OF NON-CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
The main trend in the European Union has been toward adopting the 
principle of corporate criminal liability as opposed to a model based on the 
criminal culpability of individuals within a corporation. However, some 
countries have been confined by tradition and lag behind the evolution of 
different models of corporate culpability. This is true of both the German 
and Italian systems. Both countries still rely solely on administrative 
penalties to control corporate crime. 
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In Germany, the Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz enables both 
administrative agencies and criminal courts to fine corporations up to one 
million Euros for intentional criminal conduct or five hundred thousand 
Euros for negligent conduct.34 In some cases these amounts may be 
exceeded when specifically provided for by statute. Under the German 
system of administrative penalties, rules governing individual criminal 
culpability are more adaptable to the corporate context. It is thus possible 
to speak of a wider conception of mens rea, one more suitable to the 
emerging social and juridical categories. 
In Italy, societas delinquere non potest is a basic assumption, deeply 
rooted in the judicial culture and in the collective conscience. The 
principle of corporate criminal liability does not exist. The main reason for 
this is based on the Italian Constitution. Traditional doctrine establishes 
that criminal culpability is unique to individuals.35
Due to the recent need to harmonize European countries, Italian 
lawmakers enacted a new law containing “the discipline of the 
administrative responsibilities of collective entities.”36 This law is 
remarkable in that it contains detailed regulations pertaining to the direct 
responsibility of juristic persons. The law regulates both substantive and 
procedural aspects of corporate liability, and it represents a corporate 
criminal culpability system separate from that of personal criminal 
culpability. 
The new Italian statute redefines a model of administrative liability, 
which is a departure from the traditional Italian legal principles governing 
administrative responsibility. The statute report conceives this law as 
being under a tertium genus, because it combines some aspects of criminal 
law with others typical of administrative law. The result is a mixed model 
aimed at balancing the preventive effect of administrative regulation with 
the stronger guarantees of criminal law.37
The criminal aspect of the Italian model is seen in the fact that a case is 
established by criminal proceedings, with all the procedures and 
mechanisms of a criminal trial. The administrative nature derives from 
administrative responsibility, which demonstrates the intent of the 
legislature. Another administrative aspect arises from the applicable 
statute of limitations, which differs from the statute of limitations in 
 34. Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten (Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz) § 30, 1987 (BGBI.III Nr. 
454–1), available at www.aufenthattstitel.de/owig.html. 
 35. COST. art. 27(1) (Italy). 
 36. Lgs. D. 231/2001. 
 37. Law on Companies “Direct” Liability, Gazz. Uff., Decree-Law, June 8, 2001, No. 231. 
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criminal cases. This ambiguity in defining legislation has attracted 
criticism under traditional Italian doctrine. Traditional doctrine is 
concerned with theoretical classifications with respect to traditional 
dogmatic categories, rather than the effectiveness of the law. Current 
debate focuses on whether the new law is a form of criminal or 
administrative responsibility. If one takes into account the new norms of 
this system, it becomes clear that the indecision over criminal or 
administrative is only an abstract theoretical problem. 
The formula tertium genus used by the legislature shows the 
innovations characterizing this model. While this model does not follow a 
criminal construct, it is governed by the strong guarantees of the criminal 
process. 
The traditional systems of both Germany and Italy send a clear 
message to the social community. Because the sanctions are labeled 
administrative rather than criminal, they are perceived to be less serious 
and, therefore, are not stigmatizing, even when imposed by criminal 
courts. 
These types of punitive models reveal the same weakness in 
counteracting corporate criminal liability: they both lack a fundamental 
feature unique to criminal law: the stigma. Professor Friedman’s 
groundbreaking essay, The Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 
stresses the importance of stigma.38 Friedman concludes that corporations’ 
well-defined social identity causes them to suffer from the moral 
condemnation exclusive to criminal law. The other branches of the legal 
system do not express the same moral disapproval. 
In contrast, the most advanced legal theory has shown that criminal law 
performs a positive symbolic function. We live in a society that lacks 
ideological alternatives and has lost traditional familial, religious, and 
other ethical values. The disintigration of societal ethics as points of 
reference for the community has caused a transfer of ethical functions to 
criminal law. Policy now requires that criminal law directly reshape 
society’s moral code, rather than simply indirectly influencing it. This is 
why even the most sophisticated non-criminal models are inadequate to 
control corporate crime. 
 38. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 838, 838–40 (2000). 
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VII. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND GOALS OF PUNISHMENT 
There are various advantages of introducing a system of corporate 
criminal liability. In modern legal systems, adopting principles of 
corporate criminal liability depends on the level of legal and social 
awareness of the crisis of classical criminal law. The problem is criminal 
law’s traditional focus on the individual and its corresponding inadequacy 
in counteracting corporate crime. 
Many of the crimes most dangerous to society originate from an 
organization’s activities and incentives. The criminal aggressiveness of 
organizations can be so devastating that it requires the implementation of 
new control techniques that exceed punishments for individual offenders. 
Corporate crime experts have thoroughly studied the rationales that 
justify punishing organizations.39 Some basic points on the advantages of 
corporate criminal liability deserve brief analysis with respect to the goals 
of punishment. These goals can be characterized as retributive, deterrent, 
and rehabilitative. 
Corporate criminal liability can successfully achieve its goal of 
retribution. A corporation’s economic resources allow for the payment of a 
fine that reflects the seriousness of an offense. Corporate offenses are 
normally extreme and damaging crimes, and thus better compensated by 
the corporation than by an individual agent. 
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines insist on retribution.40 They insist that 
sanctions be just, while being proportional to the seriousness of the 
offense and to corporation’s level of culpability. The fine directly 
correlates to the seriousness of the offense. The more extreme the damage 
caused, the higher the fine.41
The requirement of just punishment is reflected in the organizational 
sanctions, expressly created to punish organizations that “operated 
primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means.”42 In 
these cases fines will be set at an amount “sufficient to divest the 
organization of all its net assets.”43 Just punishment for corporate crime 
also ensures public confidence in, and respect for the law. Society must 
perceive criminal justice as a just system, because justice can reaffirm 
those values trampled on by corporate avarice. The penalty for the 
 39. A detailed analysis of these various rationales is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 6, § 8B1.1. 
 41. Id. § 8C2.5. 
 42. Id. § 8C1.1. 
 43. Id. 
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corporate offender must be proportional to the harm committed so that it 
satisfies the public’s demand for vengeance. Strong penalties for 
organizational crimes are the perfect answer to society’s increased desire 
for tougher criminal sanctions. 
Corporate criminal liability also ensures the goal of rehabilitation. 
While criminal sanctions have limited ability to reform individuals, 
imposing sanctions on a corporation can correct the corporate culture of 
the organization. Where there is no human psyche to reorient, a criminal 
sanction can involve an invasive and extreme reconstruction. This can 
result in a complete reform of a corporation’s practices after the offense. 
Probation is an important tool that enables reform of wayward 
corporations under American law. To prevent future offenses, probation 
may require a corporation to  
submit to the court an effective compliance and ethics program;[] 
. . . [to] make periodic reports to the court or probation officer . . . 
regarding the organization’s progress in implementing the program 
. . . . In order to monitor whether the organization is following the 
program . . . the organization shall submit to . . . a reasonable 
number of regular or unannounced examinations of its books and 
records[;] . . . [or] interrogation of knowledgeable individuals 
within the organization.44
Legal theorists also consider deterrence a main goal of corporate 
criminal liability. U.S. federal law has adopted the most modern 
preventive system to counteract corporate crime. The Introductory 
Commentary of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for organizations states, 
“. . . the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their agents, taken 
together, will provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives 
for organizations to maintain internal mechanism for preventing, 
detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.”45
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines do not use only the traditional 
prevention methods of threatening sanctions to deter criminal conduct. In 
addition to the classic deterrent of imposing high fines for corporate crime, 
a corporation also must adopt internal mechanisms to prevent and detect 
criminal activity. To be successful, an effective compliance and ethics 
program requires the implementation of seven factors specified in the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines.46
 44. Id. § 8D1.4(c). 
 45. Id. chap. 8, introducing cmt. 
 46. Id. § 8B2.1. 
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In May 2004, the U.S. Sentencing Commission strengthened the 
criteria for effective compliance and ethics programs. The Sentencing 
Commission first inserted the criteria into a separate guideline to 
emphasize the importance of this program, later introducing more detailed 
requirements. An effective program requires that the organization has 
exercised due diligence to prevent the crime; and that it has otherwise 
promoted “an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and 
commitment to compliance with the law. . . .”47
This revolutionary preventive model conceives of a complex 
mechanism of crime prevention controls within the corporation. It is an 
intermediate structure between the corporation and the criminal justice 
system. Under this mechanism, corporate managers perform the role of 
internal law enforcement agents. These agents are obligated to assist 
public authorities in preventing corporate crime. In addition, they must 
cooperate in investigations dealing with offenses by corporate agents. 
These compliance programs affect corporate behavior by inserting 
sophisticated mechanisms into the internal structure of the corporation. 
This monitoring system reduces the risk of behavior as a source of 
corporate crime. If a crime occurs and the corporation can show that it 
occurred despite the implementation of an effective compliance and ethics 
program, it enjoys a presumption against serious sanctions. Its fine can be 
reduced by as much as 95%, and probation can be avoided.48 However, if a 
crime occurs and the corporation had refused to adopt a compliance 
program, or had failed to implement an effective one, heavy penalties will 
be applied.49
This new approach to deterrence is called the carrot-stick model. The 
stick consists of the application of fines, which are much higher than in the 
past. The carrot consists of a reduction in fines if the corporation has 
adopted an effective compliance and ethics program. 
CONCLUSION 
There are no other judicial systems that follow the U.S. approach. The 
U.S. has adopted the most modern system of sanctions to counteract 
corporate crime. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines possess a complex 
structure that represents the convergence of two modern tendencies: the 
 47. Id. § 8B2.1(b). 
 48. Id. § 8C2.5(f). 
 49. Id. §§ 8C2.4, 8C2.5. 
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exponential growth of corporate crimes and the refinement of sentencing 
mechanisms. 
Legal theorists insist that organizational sentencing guidelines rely 
upon a philosophy of economic deterrence, because they offer 
corporations strong incentives to prevent and detect offenses. The U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines reflect an approach with retributive, preventive, and 
deterrent elements. This reflects an innovative philosophy in the control of 
corporate crime, the core of which is found in an effective compliance and 
ethics program. 
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